Povežite se s nama

Naslovnica

White House Briefing on Meetings Between Obama and China’s Xi

PODJELI:

Objavljeno

on

BIJELA KUĆA
Ured za tisakSAD-bijeli-kuća-vidi-video-igre-kao-Snažan-srednje-2
Lipnja 8, 2013

BRISANJE PRESSOM OD
NACIONALNI SAVJETNIK ZA SIGURNOST TOM DONILON
Westin Mission Hills
Palm Springs, Kalifornija
2:27 PDT

MR. RHODES: Hej, svi. Hvala vam što ste došli na ovaj kratki sastanak da zaključimo sastanke posljednja dva dana između predsjednika Obame i predsjednika Xija. Predat ću ga našem savjetniku za nacionalnu sigurnost Tomu Donilonu kako bi pročitao te sastanke. Nakon toga postavljat ćemo pitanja.

Tom je, naravno, bio vrlo fokusiran na ovaj sastanak s Kinom kao vodećom osobom predsjednika o odnosima SAD-Kine, tako da može razgovarati sa bilo čim povezanim s tim ili drugim vanjskopolitičkim pitanjima. Sretna sam i ja postavljam pitanja o pričama vezanim za FISA koje su u posljednje vrijeme u vijestima. U vezi s tim, skrenuo bih vam pažnju na činjenicu koju smo našim novinarima poslali o prikupljanju obavještajnih podataka u skladu s odjeljkom 702 FISA-e, jer on pruža vrlo dobru osnovu detalja o tom programu.

Ali s tim ću ga predati Tomu da vam otvorim prezentaciju. Tada ćemo postavljati pitanja.

MR. DONILON: Hvala, Ben. Dobar dan svima. Žao mi je što malo kasnim. Želio sam danas razgovarati o prilično jedinstvenim i važnim susretima koji su se odvijali između Kine i predsjednika Kine Xi Jinpinga u posljednjih nekoliko dana ovdje u Kaliforniji.

Na početku bih rekao da je predsjednik imao vrlo dobre razgovore u neformalnoj atmosferi, jedinstveno neformalnoj atmosferi, s predsjednikom Xijem u posljednja dva dana. Rasprave su bile pozitivne i konstruktivne, široke i prilično uspješne u postizanju ciljeva koje smo postavili za ovaj sastanak.

Oglas

Prije nego što se obratim specifičnostima sastanka, htio sam dati kontekst za to. Sastanak je, naravno, važan dio predsjednikove široke strategije nacionalne sigurnosti koju smo zacrtali od početka ove administracije, podvlačeći važnost Sjedinjenih Država da imaju produktivne i konstruktivne odnose sa važnim silama u svijetu. I naše strateško opažanje da ako su ti odnosi konstruktivni i produktivni, tada bi Sjedinjene Države mogle učinkovitije slijediti svoj nacionalni interes i da bismo mogli zajedno s drugima efikasnije riješiti globalne probleme.

This meeting is also central to our Asia Pacific rebalancing strategy. As I’ve said many times, the President believes that Asia’s future and the future of the United States are deeply and increasingly linked, and we judged early during our term in office — actually during the transition — that we were under-weighted in Asia, and we had been over-weighted in other parts of the world in the prior six or seven years, particularly with respect to our military operations in the Middle East and in South Asia.

Stoga smo poduzeli odlučnu strategiju usmjerenu na održavanje stabilnog sigurnosnog okruženja i regionalni poredak ukorenjen u ekonomsku otvorenost i mirno rješavanje sporova i poštivanje univerzalnih prava i sloboda u Aziji.

Our rebalancing strategy, of course, has a number of elements: strengthening alliances, deepening partnerships with emerging powers, empowering regional institutions, helping to build regional economic architectures that can sustain shared prosperity — TPP obviously is at the core of that. And of course it includes building a stable, productive and constructive relationship with China that we’ve been about from the outset of the administration.

Što se tiče ovog sastanka, kao što sam rekao na početku, to je u mnogo čemu bio jedinstven sastanak. I opet, ako se vratite na proučavanje svakog susreta američkog predsjednika i vodstva Kine od povijesnog sastanka predsjednika Nixona u veljači 1972. u Kini, mislim da su jedinstvenost i važnost brojnih aspekata ovog susreta zaista izaći na vidjelo.

Number one, the setting and the style. The setting here obviously was in a very informal setting and the style was informal between the President of the United States and the President of China, which is not the normal setting for these meetings if you’ve studied them over the years. I guess the closest meeting that came — with respect to kind of style — would have been the Crawford meeting in 2002 between President Bush and Jiang Zemin. But that meeting was at the end of his tenure, Jiang Zemin’s tenure, and the total meeting time was only, I think, an hour and a half or two hours. This meeting was entirely different obviously.

Drugo, dužina razgovora, za koju smo izračunali da je iznosila osam sati, i širina i dubina rasprava, koje su bile prilično strateške i pokrivale su gotovo svaki aspekt odnosa Sjedinjenih Država i Kine.

Third, the timing — and the timing was quite important here. It is at the outset of President Obama’s second term in office as President of the United States. It is at the outset of President Xi’s tenure as President of China, an expected 10-year period. So, point one.

Točka druga, također dolazi u važnom prijelaznom trenutku za Sjedinjene Države. Kao što rekoh, krećemo u drugi mandat predsjednika, ali isto tako u trenutku kada stvarno gledamo dugoročne prioritete i mislim da se naše gospodarstvo oporavlja, i mnogi radovi na obnovi koje smo uradili u dolazi do prvog mandata. I treće, suočavamo se s intenzivnim nizom bilateralnih, regionalnih i globalnih izazova na kojima je suradnja SAD-Kina presudna.

Dakle, postavka, stil, dužina razgovora, širina pitanja o kojima se razgovara i vrijeme mislim da sve podvlači točku da je ovo važan i jedinstven sastanak američkog predsjednika i kineskog čelnika. I opet, mislim da ako se vratite natrag i pažljivo proučite susrete čelnika Sjedinjenih Država i Kine od 1972. godine, mislim da to zaista postaje sasvim jasno.

How did this meeting come about? Let me discuss that for just a couple of minutes. We have, from the outset of the second term, undertaken to, in a deliberate and purposeful way, engage with the leadership of — the new leadership of China. Indeed, President Obama had a telephone conversation with President Xi congratulating him on his election as President on March 14th, the day he was elected. I think he had literally just come from the meeting and President Obama talked to him that afternoon.

We then undertook a series of encounters with the Chinese. Secretary Lew went out almost immediately to discuss economic issues. General Dempsey, the head of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, went out to discuss military and security issues. Secretary Kerry went out to discuss diplomatic issues and foreign policy issues. And I followed the three of those meetings with my own travel to China just a couple of weeks ago to discuss the broad range of issues facing the United States and China, and to lay the foundation for this meeting. So again, we’ve had a purposeful and deliberate effort to engage with the leadership of China and to work on this relationship as we go into our second term.

Dalje smo se pitali kada bi se predsjednik i predsjednik Xi trebali susresti. A prema trenutnom rasporedu to ne bi bilo sve do sastanka G20 u Sankt Peterburgu ovog rujna. I pogađalo nas je kao predugo; vakuum bi bio prevelik. A predsjednik je odlučio da će se obvezati pokušati zakazati sastanak ranije. I to je, naravno, ovaj sastanak.

Također smo dobro razmislili o stilu sastanka i koja bi bila svrha. I imali smo kao cilj, konkretan cilj izgraditi osobni odnos između predsjednika i predsjednika Xija, i imati priliku ne pod pritiskom da budemo na margini drugog multilateralnog sastanka da stvarno sjednemo i istražimo konture SAD-a -Kina veza.

The structure of the meetings: The meetings began, as you know, yesterday afternoon, and the initial topics for discussion were the priorities that each President has for his country today in order to set the strategic context for the discussion. So President Xi talked at some length about his plans for his presidency and his government’s plan to cross a range of issues, starting with the economic issues. President Obama talked about his plans for his second term and how he saw things unfolding, and then they had a broader conversation about how these — the strategic context affected U.S.-China relations.

So that is, again, I think a unique conversation between a President of the United States and a President of China to have, again, at the outset of President Obama’s second term and at the beginning of President Xi’s term, a quite lengthy discussion about how they see where their countries are domestically and what their priorities are internationally. That was the first set of sessions.

Secondly, last night, over dinner, we discussed a full range of bilateral issues, including security issues, and have a lengthy conversation last night about North Korea, which I can talk about if you’d like to do that.

This morning, President Obama and President Xi went for a walk to have a one-on-one meeting — a true one-on-one meeting — with just interpreters present — went for a walk around the property here and then found a place to sit down. That meeting lasted for about 50 minutes this morning — and again, talking about a number of the key issues between the United States and China.

They came back from that meeting, and we sat down again at the conference table and then undertook a quite extensive discussion about economic issues, including cyber issues — which of course we believe needs to be at the center of the economic discussions that the United States and China are having.

Kao što rekoh, sinoć na večeri imali smo dugu raspravu o Sjevernoj Koreji, i dopustite mi da razgovaram o tome samo nekoliko minuta. Kao što rekoh, to je bila značajna rasprava sinoć tijekom večere. I kao što svi znate tko pokriva to pitanje, Kina je posljednjih mjeseci poduzela brojne korake kako bi Sjevernoj Koreji poslala jasnu poruku, uključujući povećanu provedbu sankcija i javne izjave visokog vodstva u Kini.

Predsjednici su se sinoć složili da je to ključno područje za pojačanu suradnju SAD-Kine. Složili su se da Sjeverna Koreja mora denuklearizirati; da niti jedna zemlja neće prihvatiti Sjevernu Koreju kao nuklearnu naoružanu državu; te da ćemo zajedno raditi na produbljivanju suradnje i dijaloga SAD-Kine kako bismo postigli denuklearizaciju. Predsjednik je također naglasio predsjedniku Xi da će Sjedinjene Države poduzeti sve korake koje trebamo poduzeti da se branimo i mi i naši saveznici od prijetnje koju predstavlja Sjeverna Koreja.

The two sides stressed the importance of continuing to apply pressure both to halt North Korea’s ability to proliferate and to make clear that its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons is incompatible with its economic development goals. The discussions on this issue I believe will allow us to continue to move ahead and work in a careful way in terms of our cooperation to work together to achieve our ends.

I think the bottom line is I think we had quite a bit of alignment on the Korean issue — North Korean issue, and absolute agreement that we would continue to work together on concrete steps in order to achieve the joint goals that the United States and China have with respect to the North Korean nuclear program.

As I said during the economic discussion that we had today, cybersecurity and cyber issues were an important topic. And again, I think they took — actually those issues took up most of the discussion this morning between President Obama and President Xi. Obviously, given the importance of our economic ties, the President made clear the threat posed to our economic and national security by cyber-enabled economic espionage. And I want to be clear on exactly what we’re talking about here. What we’re talking about here are efforts by entities in China to, through cyber attacks, engage in the theft of public and private property — intellectual property and other property in the United States. And that is the focus here, which is why it was in the economic discussion this morning.

And again, we had a detailed discussion on this. The President underscored that resolving this issue is really key to the future of U.S.-China economic relations. He asked President Xi to continue to look seriously at the problem that we’ve raised here.

And again, I gave a speech on this in March in New York, and went through exactly what the agenda would be for us with respect to China, and number one is to acknowledge this concern. And I think this concern is acknowledged at this point. Number two — to investigate specifically the types of activities that we have identified here — and the Chinese have agreed to look at this. And third, to engage in a dialogue with the United States on norms and rules — that is what is acceptable and what’s not acceptable in the realm of cyber. The two Presidents provided guidance to the new cyber working group, which, as you know, has been set up under out strategic economic dialogue, which will engage in a dialogue, as I said, on the rules and norms of behavior in cyberspace that will explore confidence-building measures. And we instructed the teams to report back on their discussions to the leaders.

Other issues that were discussed at some length obviously was the economy — and we can go into some depth on that if you’d like to — human rights, and importantly, military-to-military relationships between the United States and China.

This has been an important aspect of our discussions with China in the last year and a half or two years, and the fact is, of course, that it’s the military-to-military relationship that lag behind our political and our economic relationship. This was acknowledged on the Chinese side, and we actually have some momentum behind increasing and deepening these relationships as we go forward here, as we try to build a comprehensive and positive relationship with China.

I think, again, that the Presidents’ meetings here at Sunnyland were, as I said, without a doubt unique. And as President Obama said yesterday, the challenge that he and President Xi face us to turn the aspiration of charting a new course here for our relationship into a reality, and to build out what President Xi and President Obama call the new model of relations between great powers.

So, with that, I’d be glad to take your questions. I could also go on for another hour or two about the details of the meeting. (Laughter.)

Q Tom, rekli ste da u ovom trenutku Kinezi priznaju zabrinutost zbog cyber-a. Koliko su oni specifični u ovom priznanju na privatnim sastancima s obzirom na to da u javnosti imaju tendenciju da izbjegavaju to priznati? A Xi je također sinoć na Bilati spomenuo da je i Kina žrtva cyber-hakiranja. Govore li da SAD ciljaju Kinu ili ostavljaju takve šire u tim raspravama?

MR. DONILON: A couple of things — and, thanks, Julie. Number one, as I said, it’s important to understand exactly what we’re talking about here. The discussion that we’re having with China with respect to this topic is really not focused on cyber-hacking and cyber crime. These are problems that we’ve faced and we’ve faced jointly, and we need to work together in a joint way to defend ourselves against these and to come up with norms of rules of the road with respect to those problems that we face as two nations whose economy and whose full range of activities are increasingly online and increasingly linked up to the Internet, which makes them vulnerable.

That’s not the focus of the discussion, though, that we had today — except to the extent that we both acknowledge that this is a problem and for the two large economies in the world addressing them is important.

The specific issue that President Obama talked to President Xi about today is the issue of cyber-enabled economic theft — theft of intellectual property and other kinds of property in the public and private realm in the United States by entities based in China. And the President went through this in some detail today with some specifics today and asked the Chinese government engage on this issue and understand that it is — if it’s not addressed, if it continues to be this direct theft of United States’ property, that this was going to be a very difficult problem in the economic relationship and was going to be an inhibitor to the relationship really reaching its full potential.

We’ve undertaken, as you know, a systematic effort with respect to this issue. We have had conversations with the Chinese about it over the course of the last year or so. We’ve raised it publicly. I did so — the first administration official to do it. And we have had increasingly direct conversations with the Chinese through the various dialogues that we’ve set up.

What’s critical, though, I think is that it is now really at the center of the relationship. It is not an adjunct issue, it’s an issue that is very much on the table at this point.

With respect to the question that you asked directly about whether they acknowledge it, it’s interesting, you could ask whether or not the Chinese government at the most senior levels was aware of all the activities that have been underway with respect to the cyber-enabled theft — you can’t answer that question, though, today. You’d have to — it’s quite directly and it’s quite obvious now that the Chinese senior leadership understand clearly the importance of this issue to the United States, the importance of the United States of seeking resolution of this issue.

Q If I could just draw you out a little bit more on that, Tom. You said that the President went through some very specific information about cyber-hacking. Did he outline some specific cases of theft? And if you could go into North Korea a little bit — what specifically did they agree to do? Did they — are there going to be more talks? Go back to the United Nations? What exactly?

MR. DONILON: With respect to cyber, I think it’s accurate to say that the President described to President Xi the exact kinds of types of problems that we’re concerned about, and underscored that the United States did not have any doubt about what was going on here, that in fact, that these activities had been underway and that they were inconsistent with the kind of relationship that we want to build with China, which is a comprehensive partnership. Having a comprehensive partnership at the same time when you have large-scale theft underway is not — well, it’s going to be very difficult to do.

But this, as I was saying to Julie, I think what’s important here is this is a broad relationship with China. We have a full range of issues. We have a half-a-trillion-dollar-a-year trade relationship with China. We have all manner of interaction between the United States and China. We are highly interdependent countries and societies and economies, and again, we have a range of issues. And this is an issue that’s come to the fore and it’s one that is going to have to be resolved, again, in the context of this broad relationship.

With respect to North Korea, I think the important point here is full agreement on the goals — that is denuclearization; full agreement that in fact the Security Council resolutions which put pressure on North Korea need to be enforced, and full agreement that we will work together to look at steps that need to be taken in order to achieve the goal.

Why? Now, let’s talk about that for just a second also with respect to motivations here. How have the Chinese and the United States come to the same view with respect to North Korea and the absolute unacceptability of a full-on nuclear weapons program.

I mislim da je do ovoga došlo. Dolazi do utjecaja, ako hoćete, Sjeverne Koreje da nastavi provoditi program nuklearnog oružja koji će im omogućiti da postanu proliferator, što bi im omogućilo da predstavljaju prijetnju Sjedinjenim Državama, kao što smo razgovarali i ja. " ranije smo razgovarali s ovom skupinom, i što bi im omogućilo da stvarno iskoriste, ako hoćete, sigurnost u sjeveroistočnoj Aziji.

Priznata država nuklearnog oružja u Pjongjangu, program naoružanja u Pjongjangu, naravno, imala bi duboke posljedice u ostatku sjeveroistočne Azije, a to su očito rezultati koje Kinezi ne žele vidjeti. To je rezultat koji Sjedinjene Države ne žele vidjeti. Dakle, mislim da je ono što ovdje u osnovi imate zajedničku analizu prijetnji i zajedničku analizu kakve bi posljedice i utjecaj mogao imati Sjeverna Koreja na program nuklearnog oružja.

Da.

Oznaka Q.

MR. DONILON: Bok, Mark.

P Mogu li postaviti pitanje FISA-e?

MR. DONILON: Yes, but I’d rather —

P Oprosti. Mogu li postaviti pitanje FISA-e? Možete li mi reći kakvu istragu želi predsjednik protiv propuštanja materijala FISA? Želi li kriminalističku istragu?

MR. DONILON: Ben, hoćeš li ovo uzeti?

MR. RHODES: Da, uzet ću ovo. Prije svega, Mark, ono na što smo fokusirani upravo sada, a to ste vidjeli i u izjavi DNI-a, iskreno je, procijenjujući štetu nanesenu nacionalnoj sigurnosti SAD-a otkrivanjem ovoga informacije, koje su nužno tajne, jer Sjedinjene Države trebaju biti u mogućnosti provoditi obavještajne aktivnosti, a da se te metode ne otkriju svijetu.

Dakle, trenutačno je u tijeku pregled kako bismo razumjeli kakva potencijalna šteta može biti učinjena. Kako se odnosi na bilo kakve potencijalne istrage, još uvijek smo u ranoj fazi toga. Očito bi se u to trebalo uključiti i Ministarstvo pravosuđa. Dakle, mislim da će to narednih dana riješiti Ministarstvo pravosuđa obavještajne zajednice u savjetovanju s potpunom međuagencijom na koju utječu ta vrlo uznemirujuća curenja informacija o nacionalnoj sigurnosti.

Q And one question on China — on the lighter side. Can you tell me about the bench that was given as a gift? Did President Xi —

MR. DONILON: Želiš raditi klupu?

MR. RHODES: Da.

MR. DONILON: Pustit ću Ben da napravi klupu.

P Da li ga je predsjednik dostavio?

MR. RHODES: Razumijem nekoliko činjenica o klupi. Klupa je bila napravljena od crvenog drveta, što je očito vrlo jedinstveno u ovom dijelu Sjedinjenih Država. I Protokolarni ured mislim da vam može dati više detalja, ali mislim da je Tom spomenuo da su dvojica vođa mogli prošetati i moći sjediti na onome što je postalo klupa koju će Kinezi voditi sa sobom.

Ali opet, mislim da je to ilustracija prelijepog dijela svijeta u kojem se, naravno, proteže dalje prema sjeveru. A mi možemo dobiti dodatne detalje od naših protokolarnih ljudi.

MR. DONILON: Mark, samo nekoliko stvari koje treba dodati, doduše, ne posebno s klupe, već s obzirom na osobnu interakciju predsjednika Obame i predsjednika Xija. Kao što sam već rekao, mi smo to zaista vidjeli kao priliku da dva predsjednika u važnom trenutku ovdje prodube svoj osobni odnos, uspostave i prodube svoj osobni odnos kao temelj za daljnji napredak; kako bismo riješili niz pitanja koja moramo riješiti.

And I think from that perspective that this meeting was quite successful — a lot of time together, a lot of personal time together including — again, quite unusual for the President of China and the President of the United States to spend pure one-on-one time together without any aids present, just interpreters, as I said, for an extended period of time.

Vrlo živa večera sinoć, a također na kraju današnjih sjednica, Mark, predsjednik je također mogao popodne provesti neko vrijeme s predsjednikom Xijem i njegovom suprugom, gospođom Peng, oko 30 minuta prije nego što je kineska delegacija krenula za Peking.

Pa sam vam htio pružiti osjećaj svih onih elemenata za koje mislimo da su važni za izgradnju vrste odnosa kakvu bismo željeli vidjeti izgrađene između dvaju vođa, kao i odnos koji gradimo između njih dvoje vlade.

G. RODES: Jessica.

Q I’ve got two questions —

MR. DONILON: Dobro.

QI mislim da je predsjednik Xi pozvao predsjednika Obame u Kinu. Važno je pratiti to brzo kako biste nadogradili ovaj odnos. Možete li ukratko razgovarati o malo boje u susretu s Prvom damom Kine?

A kad se okrenete pitanju FISA, sad kad je DNI deklasificirao neke podatke o PRISMU, možda možete malo slobodnije govoriti o tome. Možete li pomoći ljudima da razumiju, sada kada administracija kaže da su ciljane samo osobe koje nisu iz SAD-a, Guardian izvještava da su 3 milijarde digitalnih predmeta prikupljene s američkih servera samo u ožujku. Kako možete to objasniti i uvjeriti Amerikance da je nadzor ograničen na neamerikance?

MR. DONILON: Hvala, Jessica. Što se tiče posjeta, ovo je bio jedinstveni posjet predsjednika Xija Kaliforniji. Uzgred, ono što je ujedno i još jedan zanimljiv aspekt ovoga je da su Sjedinjene Države to predložile, a predsjednik Xi je stvarno vrlo brzo prihvatio poziv da se ovaj sastanak održi prilično rano u njegovom mandatu. Što se tiče budućih posjeta, što je vaše pitanje, mislim da dolaze u dvije kategorije i o njima smo razgovarali na sastancima. Jedan bi bio sličan neformalni posjet Kini, a drugi formalnija uzajamna razmjena državnih posjeta. Predsjednici su razgovarali o oba ova pitanja i složili se da njihovi timovi rade na rasporedu i pokušaju to zakazati.

Mislim da je suština u ovome, Jessica. Prvo je mjesto da bi predsjednik želio sličnu sjednicu održati u Kini, izvan glavnog grada, u opuštenijem okruženju kako bi imao neformalne vrste prijema i prijema ovdje. I sigurno ćemo raditi na tome da sastavimo sljedeći, ako želite, ciklus razmjene državnih posjeta Washingtonu i Pekingu.

With respect to the meeting that the President had with Madam Peng and President Xi, it was about 30 minutes. It took place in the sunroom if you — in the Annenberg House. They discussed a number of things, including her career and her activities as First Lady of China.

Ben, želiš li uzeti ovaj?

MR. RHODES: Yes. Jessica, first of all, I’d point you to the DNI facts on PRISM, which I think put out a lot of information, including the fact that the U.S. government cannot target anyone under the court-approved procedures for Section 702 collection unless there is a foreign intelligence purpose for the acquisition of that information.

So in other words, even for foreign persons there has to be an additional step to identify a nexus to foreign intelligence collection to pursue additional information. For U.S. citizens and U.S. persons and people in the United States, they cannot be intentionally targeted by this program, so they are not a part of what the goal of this collection is. Furthermore, if any U.S. citizen were to become engaged in — was engaged in activities that were of interest to the government, we would have to — just as with the phone situation, we would have to go back and obtain a warrant to pursue further collection on the content of any U.S. individual’s communications.

Stoga bi američka vlada trebala imati dodatni sloj osim PRISM-a za praćenje i preispitivanje informacija povezanih s američkim osobama koje su potencijalno povezane s, na primjer, terorizmom.

Q Možete li komentirati taj obujam podataka i, ako je moguće, kako se ta količina podataka odnosi na osobe koje nisu iz SAD-a?

MR. RHODES: I can’t comment — I mean, the NSA and the intelligence community are probably the people that could comment on the volume of this data. To be clear here, it’s not as if there are people sitting there reading every piece of information that may be in the universe of collection that the U.S. government has. As we discussed with the phone program, there is a type of data that we call metadata that is more extensive but more anonymous type of collection.

I think the point that’s very important for Americans to understand is that for the U.S. government to decide to pursue an investigation of an American citizen or a U.S. person, there would have to be an additional step beyond these programs that have been described to get a warrant and to essentially pursue a lead if there’s a suspected nexus to terrorism.

So just as the President said, we’re not listening to anybody’s phone calls. We’re also not going out and seeking to read people’s electronic communications. If we were able to detect a potential nexus to terrorism, we’d have to go back to a judge and pursue a warrant to try to investigate that lead, just as we would in any other intelligence or criminal procedure.

So as the fact sheet makes clear, these are broad programs that do not, again, target U.S. persons or people in the United States. And to go a step deeper, we’d have to go back and go through all the procedures of getting an additional warrant.

I think that the fact sheet also lays out, as we said with the information related to telephone data, that this is rigorously overseen by all three branches of government. So this is a FISA provision, so the court is involved in all of this activity. This is also overseen by Congress in their semi-annual reports, for instance, provided to Congress on these activities. And they’re obviously part of the Patriot Act that has been reauthorized by Congress in 2009, 2011. And of course, the executive branch has built-in procedures for reviewing these programs through inspector generals and other mechanisms to make sure that there’s not abuse and to make sure they were putting in place appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the American people.

Q Follow up —

MR. RHODES: We’ll get to you. But I want to — let’s go to Jackie here.

Q Hi. Just on two separate things real quick. Did you discuss at all the TransPacific Partnership, and did China indicate a willingness to join those discussions? And on the climate change — it’s quite a significant agreement that you released. You said before the meeting there would be no deliverables. Does this not qualify as a deliverable? Was it a surprise that this came together?

MR. DONILON: Thanks, Jackie. With respect to the second question — I’ll come back to the first in a minute — it’s not a surprise. We have been working on it. Earlier this year, Secretary Kerry set up a working group on climate to develop practical steps that we could take together to address climate change. And during the course of the meeting, by the way, more generally, the Presidents did discuss climate and, of course, agreed that we have a strong joint interest in addressing the climate issue — a strong joint interest from a lot of perspectives, including sustainable economic growth.

As a result of the working group’s efforts, there was ready today an example of practical cooperation. And it was, Jackie, just ready for the two Presidents to agree to today to work together to address the impact of the hydrofluorocarbons on climate change. The U.S. has been leading the effort to use a Montreal Protocol process to phase down the production and consumption of HFCs. More than 100 countries support the effort, and today, importantly, China agreed to work with the U.S. on this initiative. HFCs, as you know, are a potent source of greenhouse gases. I think we passed out a detailed fact sheet with respect to this agreement.

But again, I think — I’d just underscore, it’s the sort of practical cooperation we’re working on to see more of in the climate change area and in other areas of our relationship. So the bottom line there is that we had the working group set up. The work had been done. It was ready to be agreed to, and we didn’t see any need — any reasons that the Presidents across the table just shouldn’t agree to it today and put it out formally, with respect to our joint work now at the Montreal and the Montreal process.

Second question, the other question you asked was about TPP. A couple of points on that. As you know, the TransPacific Partnership is one of the major initiatives that the administration has underway. It’s really the principal thrust of our economic work and our rebalancing effort in Asia. We hope to try to complete the TPP by later this year, and maybe as early as October. And as I said, it’s been a very important project for us.

It was discussed a bit today, with President Xi indicating that China was interested in having information on the process as it went forward and being briefed on the process and maybe setting up a more formal mechanism for the Chinese to get information on the process and the progress that we’re making with respect to the TPP negotiation. Of course, we’ve agreed to do that. Essentially, it was a request for some transparency with respect to the effort. And again, we expect to complete that effort this year.

To je, naravno, jedna od glavnih trgovinskih inicijativa koje smo proveli, a o drugoj će se raspravljati kada odemo u Sjevernu Irsku na G8 kasnije ovog mjeseca, a to su trgovina i investicije koje želimo pregovarati i upotpuniti s. Europljani, koji su, mislim, trenutno dva glavna ekonomska interesa u svijetu.

Q So at this point, China will just be kept informed? It’s not —

MR. DONILON: At this point — that was their request, yes. Just to be direct —

Q Diplomacy and —

MR. DONILON: Well, at this point — as I said, we have been working very hard on this. We are substantially along the path with respect to this agreement. We hope to complete it this year. And President Xi’s point today was that the Chinese would like to be kept informed and have some transparency into the process. And I’ve given you everything that was said on it. Thanks, Jackie.

P hvala. Je li nešto rekao predsjednik Obama gospodinu Xiju o napetosti između Japana i Kine zbog otoka Senkaku?

MR. DONILON: They discussed the Senkaku Island issue at some length last night at the dinner. The United States’ view on this, as you know, is we don’t take a position, ultimately, on the sovereignty issue. But the President’s points last night were along these lines — that the parties should seek to de-escalate, not escalate; and the parties should seek to have conversations about this through diplomatic channels and not through actions out of the East China Sea. That’s essentially the conversation that took place last night.

QI sam vas htio razgovarati konkretno o Sunnylandsu. Zašto ste izabrali imanje Annenberg? I jesu li predsjednici imali priliku igrati golf, loviti ribu? Da li predsjednik planira koristiti golf teren? Jeste li se malo razočarali što predsjednik Xi nije ostao na imanju?

MR. DONILON: Pa, hvala na pitanju. Broj XNUMX, došli smo ovdje do objekta jer smo ga upoznali s dostupnim konferencijskim centrom za predsjedničke sastanke i sastanke državnih tajnika. Imali smo dosje o Sunnylandu, ako biste vi kao moguće mjesto na vrhu bili broj jedan.

Number two, as I said earlier, we were seeking to have an early meeting between President Obama and President Xi. President Xi was traveling to Latin America, President Obama was going to be on the West Coast in the month of June, and we lighted on the idea that one way to do this in a relaxed setting would be to — and to do it early — would be to have it in California — again, connected with President Xi’s visit to Mexico and Central America, and to President Obama’s planned visits out here to Northern California and Los Angeles. So it fit together.

And as you know, it’s a facility which is intentionally and precisely designed for exactly these kinds of meetings. And it was a terrific facility for us to use today. I don’t know — President Obama was staying here and the Chinese delegation stayed at its hotel. That’s the normal — that would be the normal approach that — it would be unusual for them to stay in the same place.

Što je s golfom?

MR. DONILON: Ne znam za golf.

MR. RHODES: We’ll keep you updated on golf. (Laughter.)

Q It’s a big deal out here.

MR. DONILON: Puno stvari radim u svom trenutnom položaju, a jedna od njih nije golf. (Smijeh.)

Q Mr. Donilon, what type of outreach is the administration going to do with other Asian allies, specifically about this meeting, in order to reassure them in a situation where the U.S. and China are getting much closer that it’s not at the cost of the other allies being edged out? And then, secondly, on the timing of your announced departure, it seemed a little odd that it came just days before this summit. Could you maybe explain the context of that timing, and why it was before and not after?

MR. DONILON: Okay. Number one, with — it’s an excellent question on the allies and partners in the region. We have been in touch with allies and partners in the region prior to this meeting to go through with them what we expected to be the issues and our approach. I personally talked to senior officials in most of the allied governments prior to the session. We certainly will be in direct touch with them after the session. I think I actually have meetings with representatives on Tuesday to go through a complete debrief, and I expect that the President will be in touch with his counterparts of the key allies to go through this.

Ponavljam, ovo je dio naših pokušaja uravnoteženja. A naš napor za rebalansiranje Azije sveobuhvatan je pokušaj da ispravimo ono što smo vidjeli kao neravnotežu u našim naporima na globalnoj razini, da više ulažemo u Aziju, jer svoju budućnost sve više povezujemo s Azijom kako idemo u 21. stoljeće.

And as I said earlier, that rebalancing effort has many elements to it. It includes, first and foremost, reinvigoration of our alliances, and I think we’ve been quite successful on that, frankly, from the time we’ve come into office. It includes engaging and deepening our relationship with emerging powers such as India and Indonesia, and we’ve been quite active on that. It involves our working on, if you will, the security and political architecture in Asia, and we have been working very hard on that — including, by the way, the President’s decision to participate at the summit level in the East Asia Summit and our determination to make that institution be the premiere diplomatic and security institution in Asia. And I think that’s made a big difference.

To uključuje i naše napore, kao što sam upravo razgovarao s Jackiejem, s ekonomske strane gdje pokušavamo izgraditi ekonomsku arhitekturu i ovdje izraditi win-win pristupe, a TPP je naš glavni napor upravo u pogledu ekonomija. A to uključuje izgradnju produktivnog i konstruktivnog odnosa s Kinom.

Naši partneri i saveznici u regiji očekuju da ćemo ispuniti svoje obveze prema njima. Oni očekuju da će Sjedinjene Države nastaviti poduzimati sigurnosne napore, formirajući platformu, ako hoćete, koja je bila osnova na kojoj je izgrađen ekonomski i socijalni razvoj Azije, i nastavljaju pružati sve to. Ali oni također očekuju od nas da stupimo u produktivan i konstruktivan odnos s Kinom. I imamo ta dvostruka očekivanja, i kao glavna sila u Aziji, idemo oko toga.

S obzirom na moje planove, moj razgovor s predsjednikom u vezi s mojim povlačenjem iz ovog trenutnog posla započeo je zaista krajem prošle godine. Predsjednica me zamolila da ostanem do sredine ove godine. Imali smo niz projekata koji smo proveli, uključujući putovanje koje smo poduzeli, uključujući Bliski Istok i druga mjesta; brojne ekonomske inicijative o kojima sam ovdje govorio; i rad na kineskom odnosu, što smo i učinili.

I wanted to have a — those of you who know me, it’s not going to surprise you — I wanted to have a structured and timely transition. I wanted to have enough time for Ambassador Rice to work with me day in and day out as she begins her tenure as National Security Advisor on July 1, right at the middle of the year. And this was the timing that worked for that, frankly. This has been carefully considered. It has been the subject of multiple conversations between me and the President and me and Ambassador Rice, and it was the right time.

Zašto prije današnjih sastanaka? Mislio sam da je važno, iskreno, biti što transparentniji sa svojim kineskim kolegama. Kao što znate, bio sam glavna osoba u Bijeloj kući koja se bavi višim kineskim rukovodstvom otkad smo došli na dužnost. U posljednje četiri i pol godine proveo sam desetke i desetke sati sa višim rukovodstvom u Kini. I iskreno, ne bi mi bilo ugodno dolaziti na samit s pojedincima s kojima radim na nekim najosjetljivijim temama na svijetu i ne bih bio u potpunosti upoznat s njima kakvi će mi planovi biti.

P hvala. Predsjednik Obama spomenuo je da bi SAD i Kina trebali imati zdravu konkurenciju. Možete li stoga pojasniti kakva će biti zdrava konkurencija, iz kojih područja će doći ta konkurencija i što ćemo očekivati ​​od SAD-a koji će raditi s Kinom u stvaranju te zdrave konkurencije? Hvala vam.

MR. DONILON: Yes. To build a healthy competition you would expect between any two large countries — so within that context, it’s the kind of healthy competition that you would expect between any two large countries in all manner of areas, including in the economic area. And so it was I think a pretty straightforward observation about the relationship.

Now, what, though, we have also been talking about here is the importance of not having the relationship deteriorate unnecessarily into strategic rivalry, if you will. And again, this is really what’s at the root of this new model of great power relations that President Xi and President Obama have talked about, that President Clinton — that Secretary Clinton also talked about in a very important speech she gave last year at the U.S. Institute for Peace.

Što je korijen ovoga? Zašto smo došli na ovo? Ukorijenjena je u razgovoru koji vodimo ti i ja. Mnogi ljudi, posebno u polju međunarodnih odnosa i nekih ljudi u Sjedinjenim Državama i nekih ljudi u Kini, ukorijenjeni su u opažanju i gledištu da su sila koja raste i postojeća sila na neki način predodređeni za sukob; da je u stvari ovo samo neumoljiva dinamika između sila koja nastaje i postojeće moći.

We reject that, and the Chinese government rejects that. And the building out of the so-called new relationships, new model of relation between great powers is the effort to ensure that doesn’t happen; is an effort to ensure that we don’t succumb to the idea that somehow relations between countries are some immutable law of physics — that, in fact, this is about leadership, it’s about conscious decisions and it’s about doing what’s best for your respective people.

MR. RHODES: Okay, we’ll take a couple more. I’ll go to The Guardian here.

Q Thanks for taking the question. I had a broad national security policy question which I’d like to address to the National Security Advisor if possible because it’s not specifically about FISA. Yesterday, the President said that the American people shouldn’t be alarmed at what they’ve learned this week about surveillance because there was sufficient oversight from both Congress and the judiciary. What would you say to those who say that you have been invoking special privilege on numerous occasions to stop appeals reaching court? And in the case of congressional oversight, very recently Congress was told that you didn’t count how many times U.S. data was accessed, whereas today, through the informant data mining tool that we’ve written about today, we find out you count every last IP number — IP address. So how can you reassure the American people that that congressional and judicial oversight is working in the way the President says it is?

MR. DONILON: Pa, to je specifično pitanje koje ste postavili i to ću predati Benu. Ali mislim da mogu reći, da su ovi programi vrlo važni za Sjedinjene Države i njezinu sposobnost da se zaštite, broj jedan. Kao drugo, kako je jučer rekao predsjednik, ovi programi su podvrgnuti nadzoru ne samo u izvršnoj vlasti koja ima vrlo pažljive postupke i postupke kako bi se osiguralo posebno zaštita privatnosti i građanskih sloboda Amerikanaca, ali također podložna vrlo pažljivom nadzoru od strane suda, neovisne grane vlade Sjedinjenih Država, i pažljivim i upornim informiranjem i nadziranjem Kongresa. I to je mislim da je vrlo važan aspekt cijele ove rasprave, kako je jučer izložio predsjednik.

MR. RHODES: Imali ste nekoliko pitanja tamo. Prije svega, mislim da, kao što je NSA pružila u izjavi za Guardian, oni nemaju mogućnost sa sigurnošću utvrditi identitet ili lokaciju svih komunikanata unutar određene komunikacije koju oni prikupljaju. Dakle, nije da mogu konkretno odgovoriti na pitanje koji su identiteti i brojevi pojedinaca povezani sa sakupljanjem.

Ono što im je činiti je primijeniti niz alata, automatiziranih i ručnih, za pregled i karakterizaciju komunikacija i za osiguranje zaštite američkog naroda. Dakle, u suštini to znači da postoje zaštitne mjere ugrađene u način prikupljanja i pregledavanja podataka kako bi se osiguralo poštivanje prava na privatnost. I kao što rekoh, svaka dodatna istraga povezana s bilo kime zahtijeva da dodatna ovlaštenja odobri sudac.

Što se tiče Kongresa, za program Odjeljak 702 koji je danas deklasificiran, Kongres je to odobrio u prosincu 2012. i on mora Kongresu dostaviti zahtjev za izvještavanje. Dakle, ravnatelj Nacionalne obavještajne službe i državni odvjetnik moraju dostaviti polugodišnja izvješća koja ocjenjuju poštivanje postupaka ciljanja, kao i postupke minimiziranja koji se odnose na ciljanje. A tu su i dodatne upute u Kongresu i za obavještajne i pravosudne odbore povezane s ovim programom.

I would also note for people, and we’ve made this available, that with respect to the other provisions associated with telephone data under FISA, we I think made available to people that there had been numerous — I think 13 — briefings that we identified that have been given over the recent — in the recent past on that provision of FISA — and also the relevant intelligence oversight committee is the Intelligence Committee. And I think you’ve seen a letter from Senators Feinstein and Chambliss from last February — or February of 2011 that offered to provide briefings to other members of Congress who had additional questions about this particular program authorized by FISA.

So the point is people have asked about what is the President’s view generally. And I’ve been with the President since early 2007, and he expressed concerns about some of the lack of oversight and safeguards associated with programs in the past — for instance, when you had warrantless wiretapping that did not have that full oversight of a judge. What he’s done as President is say which programs are necessary, which capabilities are necessary to protect the American people, and which aren’t.

Tako je, na primjer, poboljšani program ispitivanja koji smo smatrali mučenjem za koje nismo smatrali da je primjeren našim vrijednostima ili potreban našoj nacionalnoj sigurnosti, pa smo taj program i završili. U odnosu na neke od ovih drugih programa koji su u posljednje vrijeme u vijestima, načelo koje on donosi je kako osigurati da postoje prikladne provjere i ravnoteže i nadzor ugrađeni u sve što radimo. Na primjer, kako osigurati da sve tri grane vlasti imaju oči na ove programe?

Oni su nužno tajni. Imamo razloga obavještajnu zajednicu. Imamo prijetnju od terorizma protiv koje se moramo boriti. Imamo neprijatelja koji namjerno pokušava zaobići naše metode prikupljanja inteligencije. Dakle, ne možemo jednostavno emitirati našeg terorističkog neprijatelja, evo kako prikupljamo obavještajne podatke o vama. Zbog toga, s obzirom na činjenicu da je to tajna, morate privesti na sudove i morate dovesti Kongres.

So everything that has been done and reported on in the last several days involves programs that have congressional oversight — and regularized congressional oversight — from the relevant committees. Also, through the reauthorization of the Patriot Act, in other briefings — there’s opportunities for other members to be briefed on these programs. So the elected representatives of the American people do have eyes on these programs.

Što se tiče sudova, to je program FISA. Dakle, po definiciji postoji sudac koji se mora odjaviti iz tih aktivnosti. I kao što rekoh, mora postojati dodatna prijava ako će se raditi na istragama. A mi gradimo na provjerama unutar izvršne vlasti. Dakle, u našoj administraciji uspostavili smo vrlo regulirane opće izvještaje inspektora o svemu što radimo.

Dakle, u kontekstu nužno tajnih programa, osiguravamo da postoje slojevi nadzora iz sve tri grane vlasti. A to je nešto za što predsjednik vjeruje da je potrebno kako bi se osiguralo da se briga o njihovoj privatnosti i građanskim slobodama, kako bi se osiguralo da smo pregledali jesu li ti programi učinkoviti i potrebni s obzirom na prirodu prijetnje s kojom smo suočeni. I to je princip koji će i dalje donositi.

I raspravu koja je potaknuta ovim otkrivenjima, kako je rekao, dok ne mislimo da je otkrivanje tajnih programa u interesu SAD-a za nacionalnu sigurnost, širu raspravu o privatnosti i građanskim slobodama, koju je sam podigao u njegov govor u NDU neki dan, kada je izišao s puta kako bi to identificirao kao jedan od koraka s kojima se moramo boriti, s obzirom na činjenicu da bismo, ako učinimo sve što je potrebno za našu sigurnost, žrtvovali previše privatnosti i građanske slobode, ali ako bismo učinili sve da imamo stopostotnu zaštitu privatnosti i građanskih sloboda, ne bismo poduzimali zdrave razloge da zaštitimo američki narod.

Tako ćemo imati tu raspravu. Pozdravljamo zanimanje Kongresa za ta pitanja. Pozdravljamo zanimanje Amerikanaca i naravno medija za ta izdanja. Ali mi smo sigurni da smo učinili ono što moramo učiniti kako bismo uspostavili ravnotežu između privatnosti i sigurnosti izgradnjom ovih rigoroznih mehanizama nadzora.

Q S obzirom na Sjevernu Koreju, jesu li razgovarali o ponovnim razgovorima sa šestoricom ili o jačanju sankcija Sjevernoj Koreji? I moje drugo pitanje je jesu li razgovarali o vraćanju sjevernokorejskih prevara? Hvala vam puno.

MR. DONILON: Yes. With respect to North Korea, there was a discussion about the importance of enforcing the United Nations Security Council resolutions and increase — and continuing that pressure on North Korea so that the choice is very clear to North Korea.

Na razgovorima sa šestoricom bila je rasprava o važnosti budućih pregovora da su vjerodostojni i vjerodostojni, odnosno razgovori koji bi zapravo doveli do osjetnih rezultata. A mi u ovom trenutku od Sjevernih Korejaca nismo vidjeli takvu posvećenost sadržaju potencijalnih razgovora, mislim da bi u ovom trenutku mogli ići naprijed.

And I didn’t — on the —

P Postupci Sjeverne Koreje.

MR. DONILON: O tome se nije razgovaralo.

MR. RHODES: Posljednje pitanje uputit će Kristin.

P hvala.

MR. DONILON: Hej.

Bok, Tom. Koliko ste unaprijed shvatili da će na ovaj vrh doći kineska prva dama i jeste li razmišljali o tome da uopće uključite gospođu Obamu u događaje?

MR. DONILON: I don’t know the exact timeline, but my understanding is that when we scheduled the meetings here, that there was a discussion about Madam Peng coming and that it was indicated at that point that Mrs. Obama’s schedule would not permit her to come on these dates here. And the dates, of course, are driven by a number of other factors — President Xi’s travel schedule, President Obama’s travel schedule. And so that was understood well in advance of the meetings.

MR. RHODES: U redu, hvala svima.

MR. DONILON: Samo želim reći hvala. Bila su to zaista zamišljena pitanja. Očito je izuzetno važan odnos i izuzetno važan trenutak za taj odnos i promišljena pitanja se stvarno cijene. A vidimo se u Sjevernoj Irskoj i u Njemačkoj.

Ok, hvala svima. Hvala vam.

KRAJ 3:21 PDT

Podijelite ovaj članak:

EU Reporter objavljuje članke iz raznih vanjskih izvora koji izražavaju širok raspon stajališta. Stavovi zauzeti u ovim člancima nisu nužno stavovi EU Reportera.
Oglas

Trendovi